Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 24

Issue 3

Article 3

7-1-2004

Declare Victory and Go Home: The Practical Ramifications of the
Seventh Circuit's Interpretation of Missouri v. Jenkins in School
Desegregation Cases
Michael Mahoney
Scott R. Paccagnini

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Michael Mahoney and Scott R. Paccagnini, Declare Victory and Go Home: The Practical Ramifications of
the Seventh Circuit's Interpretation of Missouri v. Jenkins in School Desegregation Cases, 24 N. Ill. U. L.
Rev. 683 (2004).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

Declare Victory and Go Home: The Practical
Ramifications of the Seventh Circuit's
Interpretation of Missouri v. Jenkins in
School Desegregation Cases
HONORABLE P. MICHAEL MAHONEY*
SCOTT R. PACCAGNINI**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

B ACKGROUND ..................................................................................
PEOPLE WHO CARE AND THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS ...........
III. PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS ............................................................
IV . C ONCLUSION ....................................................................................
I.

II.

The Fourteenth Amendment commands, "No State shall ...

683
686
689
690

deny to

J
laws[.]"

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
After
the Civil War, in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment became part of the
Constitution, the purpose of which was to bar state laws that could
discriminate or disadvantage African Americans.
I.

BACKGROUND

It took the Supreme Court over eighty-five years to decide that
African-American school children should not be discriminated against
because of the color of their skin.2 Once that decision was made, the Court

*
United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, Western
Division in Rockford, Illinois.
**
Law Clerk to the Honorable P. Michael Mahoney, Northern District of Illinois,
Western Division.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 496 (1954) [hereinafter Brown !].
Prior to Brown I, the Supreme Court did not view state-imposed school desegregation as a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This view was made clear in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), whereby the Court articulated the "separate but equal" doctrine
upholding a Louisiana law requiring separate railway cars for black and white passengers.
While the Court in Plessy stated the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to create equality
under the law, the Court stated the Fourteenth Amendment was not implemented to "abolish
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assumed the decision would be followed.3
The Court left it up to the school districts to develop remedial plans
which would correct the imbalance. This is the "with all deliberate speed"
phase of desegregation law suits. 4 Courts found that it took more than a
signed order to change 200 years of institutional discrimination.5
Particularly, democratic institutions run by elected officials refused to
change.6
Intentional discrimination desegregation lawsuits, because of this
resistance, evolved into three phases. Phase One was liability. In Phase
One, it had to be demonstrated that there was intentional discrimination
which separated the children by race. Phase Two was the remedial phase.
If liability is established, in the remedial phase, the court was to supply a
remedy if the school district would not. This remedy was to compensate
the victims of discrimination and place them in the same position they
would have been if the discrimination had not occurred. Phase Three was
unitary status.7
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality"
or to abolish "separate schools for children of different ages, sexes, and colors." 163 U.S. at
544-45.
3. It should be noted that the Brown I Court did not discuss remedial methods.
Rather, "because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these
cases presents problems of considerable complexity." 347 U.S. at 495.
4.
A year after Brown 1,the Court, in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294
(1955) [hereinafter Brown I1], addressed for the first time the question of remedial methods
in school desegregation cases. The Court, in a surprisingly short opinion, supplied general
guidelines for remedial methods. The often quoted section from the Brown 1I opinion states
that District Courts are to enter decree orders and return schools to a racially nondiscriminate basis "with all deliberate speed." 349 U.S. at 301.
5.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American
Public Education: The Courts' Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1602-03 (2003)
After Brown [I], southern states used every imaginable technique to
obstruct desegregation. Some school systems attempted to close public
schools rather than desegregate. Some school boards adopted so-called
'freedom of choice' plans which allowed students to choose where they
would enroll and resulted in continued segregation. In some places,
school systems outright disobeyed desegregation orders.
Id.
6.
See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1958) (demanding that the states'
elected officials follow judicial orders of the Supreme Court).
7.
One of the more complex problems that lower courts face after dismantling a
"dual" segregated school system is how a former "dual" system attains "unitary" status and
obtains release from judicial supervision. See DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE 48 (1995).
This is even more evident by the Supreme Court's discussion in Board of Education v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991), where the Court discussed what is meant by the term
"unitary." Some courts, according to the Dowell Court, interpret "unitary" to mean a
"school district that has completely remedied all vestiges of past discrimination," see United
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Once the remedial programs were in place and the "vestiges" of
intentional discrimination had been removed to the extent possible,8 the
district was to be returned to local control. This process was usually
brought about by a petition filed by the school district requesting unitary
status. 9 Historically, the ultimate inquiry at a unitary status hearing was
whether the constitutional violator had complied in good faith with the
desegregation remedial order since it was entered and whether the
"vestiges" of past discrimination had been eliminated. The concentration
was on the vestiges being eliminated completely. 0 Later, the Supreme
Court began to emphasize a return to local control." The de-emphasis of
the elimination of vestiges and emphasis on local control culminated in

Missouri v. Jenkins.12

States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987), while other courts have "used
'unitary' to describe any school district that has currently desegregated student assignments,
whether or not the status is solely the result of a court-imposed desegregation plan." Dowell
v. Bd. of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir. 1989).
8. Initially, the Supreme Court's focus at the unitary status phase of the case was
to determine if the vestiges of state-imposed discrimination had been removed. See Swann
v. Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) ("The objective today remains to eliminate from the
public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation."). That focus appears to have
changed with recent Supreme Court rulings. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 103
(1995).
9.
Generally, to be granted unitary status, courts would look to the six Green
factors set forth in Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
Those factors are: I) student assignments; 2) transportation; 3) physical facilities; 4)
extracurricular activities; 5) faculty assignments; and 6) resource allocation.
10.
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 103.
I1. This movement away from concentrating on whether vestiges of past
discrimination had been removed and towards an emphasis of local control was first seen in
Dowell. 498 U.S. at 237. Specifically, the Dowell Court stated early on in the opinion that
"From the very first, federal supervision of local school systems was intended as a
temporary measure to remedy past discrimination." 498 U.S. at 247. Later, the Court
discussed how "[lI]ocal control over the education of children allows citizens to participate
in decision making, and allows innovation so that school programs can fit local needs." Id.
at 248. Again, such direction can be seen in the Court's statement that "necessary concern
for the important values of local control of public school systems dictates that a federal
court's regulatory control of such systems not extend beyond the time required to remedy
the effects of past intentional discrimination." Id. at 248 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 280-82 (1977)). One wonders who the Court thought would be locally controlling
the school system after court release. Hopefully, not the very people who segregated the
school system in the first place.
12.
"On remand, the District Court must bear in mind that its end purpose is not
only 'to remedy the violation' to the extent practicable, but also to 'restore state and local
authorities to the control of a school system that is operating in compliance with the
Constitution."' 515 U.S. at 102.
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PEOPLE WHO CARE AND THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

Rockford, Illinois has had its own parallel to the nation's struggle with
desegregation lawsuits. 13 In 1973, in Quality Educationfor All Children v.

School Board, District Court Judge William J. Bauer found the Rockford
School District in violation of the United States Constitution.1 4 He wanted
the district to come up with ways to correct the results of the
discrimination. Shortly thereafter, Judge Bauer was elevated to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 15 No fewer than five district court
judges were assigned the case between 1971-1981.16 Most required the
district to file reports but did little else. I began to help monitor Quality
Educationfor All Children in 1976. No remedial order was ever entered.
No student assignment order was ever entered. The court's only
requirement was that the district periodically file reports - which showed
no improvement on the conditions Judge Bauer found to have violated the
Equal Protection Clause. 17 Finally, in 1981, Judge Roszkowski granted a
motion to dismiss the case with prejudice. There was no unitary hearing.
Nothing had been accomplished. This was Rockford's "with all deliberate
speed" phase.
In 1989,
the Rockford
schoolby
system
in federaldiscriminating
court,18 again
accused
of segregating
children
race was
and back
intentionally

13.
See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 851 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Il1.
1994); Quality Educ. for All Children, Inc. v. Sch. Bd., 362 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. I11.1973).
14.
See Quality Educ. for All Children, Inc., 362 F. Supp. at 1001 ("[Mluch of the
evidence which has been presented to this Court to date strongly suggests a problem of
minority isolation in the Rockford School District.").
15.
Judge Bauer was elevated to the Seventh Circuit on December 20, 1974 and
served on the panel that decided the majority of the People Who Care appeals.
16.
Those judges were: Judge Bauer, Judge Prentice H. Marshall, Chief Judge Joel
Flaum, Judge Alfred Kirkland, Sr., and Judge Stanley J. Roszkowski.
17.
Some of those conditions included district officials proving that there were no
educationally sound and administratively feasible alternatives to overcome the existence of
segregated schools; seeking means of eradicating the results of the school board's
discriminatory acts; and not discriminating in the hiring, assigning, dismissing, or demoting
teachers because of their race or color.
18.
While Judge Posner likes to write that the Rockford school desegregation case
was some thirty-years-old in 2001, there were actually two cases, not one, of school
desegregation. Judge Posner did acknowledge this in one opinion, but then returned to the
thirty year litigation language. See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 246 F.3d
1073, 1074 (7th Cir. 2001)
Twelve years ago the plaintiffs filed this suit against the board of
education of Rockford, Illinois, charging that the board had intentionally
discriminated against black and Hispanic students. Though nominally a
new suit, it was actually a continuation of school desegregation
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against African-American and Hispanic children.' 9 In 1994, the Rockford
School District was found to have engaged in massive discrimination and
segregation of its minority students. 20 The district did not appeal Judge
Roszkowski's order. Phase One was complete. Phase Two was assigned
to this Magistrate Judge with the consent of the parties. 2'
Soon after the finding of liability, the court began the remedial
phase.22 A comprehensive remedial order, entered in three phases, was
completed on June 7, 1996, close to the time Jenkins v. Missouri was
decided by the Supreme Court. Most of the order was accepted by the
district, but parts were appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh
Circuit emphatically sustained the district's objections.2 3
Enter Erwin Chemerinsky.24 Mr. Chemerinsky is kind of a court guru
for the Federal Judicial Center. By that I mean he is the paramount speaker
on Supreme Court issues. He is the guy that tells federal judges what the
Supreme Court is doing. He is bright, engaging and a very nice man. In
1995 all the magistrate judges in the country gathered in Salt Lake City,
Utah. I was there and so was Mr. Chemerinsky. The Jenkins opinion had
just come out. Now Jenkins, as we point out, dealt with the remedial phase
of the Kansas City, Missouri school system, not unitary status, but it did
substantially boost the idea of local control as an important factor in
desegregation cases. 25 I asked Mr. Chemerinsky what his view was on the
impact of the Jenkins decision on pending desegregation lawsuits. His
answer startled me. He said it is like what Senator George Aiken said

litigation that had started long before and had resulted in the entry of a
remedial decree as early as 1973. Realistically, we are dealing with a
lawsuit that is almost 30 years old.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
19.
See People Who Care, 851 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. I11.1994).
20.
Id. at 933 ("The plaintiffs have prevailed on the merits of their claim and have
established that the defendant has violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs.").
21.
If anyone calls you up and suggests you supervise a discrimination lawsuit, my
suggestion is that you tell them they have the wrong number. I am sure there are people in
Rockford who wish my number had been disconnected.
22.
This was a very time consuming and difficult process.
23.
See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., I ll F.3d 528, 534 (7th Cir.
1997) (finding that the provisions in the remedial order, such as racial quotas for
cheerleaders, super-seniority for minority teachers, goals of closing the white-minority gap
in test scores, and desegregation of remedial classes were "ambitious schemes of social
engineering.").
24.
Erwin Chemerinsky is the Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law,
Legal Ethics and Political Science at the University of Southern California. See Mr.
Chermerinsky's very impressive nineteen page curriculum vitae at http://sdshh.com/
attorneys/chemerinsky.resume.pdf (last visited January 13, 2004).
25.
See Green v. New Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. at 435.
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about Vietnam.26 Federal courts are to declare victory and leave. He later
made the same statement in print (twice).2 7
It was not long before I saw the impact of Jenkins on the Rockford
case. In 1999, the district had disagreed with many of my orders and
appealed them. Most of my decisions were affirmed,28 but there was an
interesting development. Judge Posner asked the attorney for the district at
oral argument when he thought the district would obtain unitary status.2 9
That issue was not before the court. No petition had been filed for unitary
status or even partial unitary status. The Rockford School District attorney
picked a date out of the air-2002. 30 The date made the opinion and
became a target for unitary status. 3' Over and over, Judge Posner in court
opinions insisted the district apply for unitary status.32 Nowhere in those
opinions was the issue of "vestiges" discussed.33

26.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 5 at 1622 ("During the Vietnam War, Senator
George Aiken said that the United States should declare victory and withdraw from
Vietnam.") (citing Albin Krebs, George Aiken, Longtime Senator and G.O.P. Maverick,
Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1984, at B10); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist
Revolution, I-SPG NEXUS 21, 32 (1996) ("During the Vietnam War, a senator said that the
United States should declare victory and withdraw. These [recent] cases show that the
Supreme Court is impatient with continuing federal court desegregation efforts and wants to
declare victory over the problem of segregation and have the federal courts withdraw.").
27.
See Cherminsky, supra note 26.
28.
See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 1083, 1091 (7th Cir.
1999) ("[W]e are being inundated by groundless appeals challenging peripheral and for the
most part unexceptionable facets of the magistrate judge's administration of the remedial
decree.").
29.
Id. at 1091 ("The board told us at argument that it thinks full compliance with
the decree is achievable by 2002; and when full compliance is achieved, the decree must be
dissolved.").
30.
While Judge Posner did state that the board should "propose to the magistrate
judge, after consultation with the plaintiffs and the master, a modification of the decree that
will include an appropriate termination date (perhaps a series of different dates, for different
programs) ....
" People Who Care, 171 F.3d at 1091. 2002 was the end date, some three
years after the Seventh Circuit's opinion. Id.
31.
Id. at 1090 ("We hoped that our 1997 decision, in cutting back the scope of the
comprehensive remedial decree, would set the stage for an early termination. We had
thought it would be followed by the school board's submitting a plan for winding up the
litigation within a definite and short period of time.").
32.
See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 246 F.3d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.
2001) (wondering "[w]hy the board asked for deferred rather than immediate dissolution...
."); People Who Care, 171 F.3d at 1091 (recommending the board submit a plan for winding
up the litigation).
33.
In fact, nowhere in the Seventh Circuit's People Who Care decision does the
court discuss whether the vestiges of past discrimination have been removed. Rather, in
response to the Jenkins decision, the Seventh Circuit, in almost every single one of its
People Who Care opinions subsequent to Jenkins, continued to "heed the admonition of the
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Jenkins had, as a practical matter, changed the landscape of school
desegregation cases. Return to local control was dominant and removal of
vestiges of discrimination was secondary. The Seventh Circuit was ready
to declare victory and leave. It did so on April 18, 2001..
II. PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS

Rather than selecting arbitrary dates and declaring victory, this author
would suggest combining Steps Two (remedial) and Three (unitary status).
The Majority in Jenkins, and the panel of the Seventh Circuit that oversaw
People Who Care, both seemed to believe desegregation cases to be
historic aberrations that, when ended, will never reappear. I am not so sure.
There may be other cases out there. Those cases will be in cities about the
size of Rockford, Illinois, with somewhere between 75,000 and 250,000
people. For those future desegregation cases possibly on the horizon, heed
the word of Jenkins and the direction of the Seventh Circuit and combine
Steps Two and Three.
A school district can be compared to a big ship. Ordering a district to
change direction is like asking an oil tanker to make a U-turn in Illinois'
Rock River. Changes in a school district can only be made during certain
times of the year and, often, only once a year. Staffing, finance and student
assignment can only be done once every twelve months. Further, when a
federal court leaves, it takes the desegregation money with it. This can
cause a financial crisis for a district.3 5 Wherever a remedial program is
ordered, a new source of funding has to be created to support the programs.
No school district has excess funds laying around which can be applied to
correct the vestiges of intentional discrimination. When unitary status is
declared, that funding source dries up. In order to have a positive impact
on a district, a court should at the time of the remedial hearing and as part
of the Comprehensive Remedial Order, set out a reasonable time frame for

Supreme Court ...to bend every effort to winding up school litigation and returning the
operation of the schools to the local school authorities." People Who Care, 246 F.3d at
1074 (internal citations omitted). Mysteriously, the language used by the Seventh Circuit,
"to bend every effort to winding up school litigation," is absent from any Supreme Court
case. Id.
34.
See People Who Care, 246 F.3d at 1076 (stating that the "Rockford public
schools have been desegregated.").
35.
Mark Bonne, Schools' Future in Community's Hands, ROCKFORD REG. STAR,
Jan. 7, 2004, available at http://www.rrstar.com/localnews/your-community/rockford/
20031221-3721.shtml (stating that "by several measures - next year's anticipated $30
million deficit, test scores well below average - the public schools remain broken."). The
article further indicates that the State of Illinois may take over the Rockford School District.
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the return to local control. This will allow for multi-year planning and
funding.
Combining Steps Two and Three will also allow minority parents and
children to have reasonable expectations as to the duration and the results
of the remedial order. Having a time frame will make the remedial phase
more of a positive experience for the community. It will allow the school
district to prepare for the time when local control is returned. It will
decrease litigation costs. It also makes sense. The time of creating the
remedy is also an appropriate time to establish the life span of the
remedies. The only remaining issue would be whether the district is
complying in good faith with implementation of the remedies. If a
remedial order is drawn up at the time of conception with an end date, the
district then knows the length of the plan, which will result in a more
productive plan. The parties could develop a plan that will meet the needs
of both and bring about a better result for the students. 36 Remember also
that unitary status can be achieved by incremental steps. It is not an all or
nothing event. This means that an area that will need more time, such as
student assignment, may be given a longer life span.
IV. CONCLUSION

The landscape of school desegregation cases has changed. While all
indications from the Seventh Circuit seem to point to an end to school
desegregation, such a presumption is unrealistic. Rather, from a practical
standpoint, what should be taken from the Seventh Circuit's interpretation
of Jenkins is not that school desegregation cases are a thing of the past, but
that the manner in which they are approached has changed. What used to
be a three step process has now, for all intents and purposes, become a two
step process with steps two and three combined. Pick a date at the remedial
stage of the litigation before some court arbitrarily declares victory.

36.
This is ultimately the goal of school desegregation cases. However, some do
not find it a realistic goal for the courts given external factors. See People Who Care, 246
F.3d at 1076 ("Yet it is obvious that other factors besides discrimination contribute to
unequal educational attainment, such as poverty, parents' education and employment,
family size, parental attitudes and behavior, prenatal, neonatal, and child health care, peergroup pressures, and ethnic culture.").

